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ABSTRACT
The ubiquity of mobile internet-enabled devices combined with wide-spread social media use during emergencies
is posing new challenges for response personnel. In particular, service operators are now expected to monitor these
online channels to extract actionable insights and answer questions from the public. A lack of adequate tools makes
this monitoring impractical at the scale of many emergencies. The TREC Incident Streams (TREC-IS) track drives
research into solving this technology gap by bringing together academia and industry to develop techniques for
extracting actionable insights from social media streams during emergencies. This paper covers the second year of
TREC-IS, hosted in 2019 with two editions, 2019-A and 2019-B, contributing 12 new events and approximately
20,000 new tweets across 25 information categories, with 15 research groups participating across the world. This
paper provides an overview of these new editions, actionable insights from data labelling, and the automated
techniques employed by participant systems that appear most effective.
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INTRODUCTION
Emergency services’ ability to respond effectively is highly dependent on their ability to obtain actionable information
about the on-the-ground situation. Traditionally, this collection is accomplished via either communication with
the public through call-centres or through reports by first responders (FEMA 2011). Wide-spread adoption of
smart phones and online networking platforms like Twitter (particularly by the younger generation) has made social
media an increasingly common communication channel during emergencies (Castillo 2016). Indeed, given the
notional tweet stream about an emergency, like a wildfire, we can imagine a range of information types that might
be shared during the incident. While the majority of tweets in such a stream likely express sentiment, solidarity, and
wishes to help from around the world (Olteanu, Vieweg, et al. 2015), more valuable content captures reports from
news services and government officials that contain useful information for people in the incident area. Meanwhile,
the most actionable information in these streams is contained within the small number of tweets by people in the
affected region who are reporting first-hand about on-the-ground conditions and immediate safety and health needs.
This shift toward social media has been noted by emergency and civil protection services, who are increasingly
searching for effective means to monitor these channels, use them to answer questions, respond to aid requests
∗corresponding author
†http://gla.ac.uk and http://dcs.gla.ac.uk/~richardm
‡https://computing.njit.edu/ and http://cody.bunta.in/
§https://www.nist.gov/ and https://www.nist.gov/people/ian-soboroff
CoRe Paper – Social Media for Disaster Response and Resilience
Proceedings of the 17th ISCRAM Conference – Blacksburg, VA, USA May 2020
Amanda Lee Hughes, Fiona McNeill and Christopher Zobel, eds.
Richard McCreadie et al. Incident Streams 2019
and more (FEMA 2013). Monitoring these channels, however, is a challenging task given the high volumes of
information posted in contrast to the relatively small proportion of actionable information (McCreadie et al. 2019).
Hence, a clear need exists for tools to assist response officers in tackling the deluge of social media content.
Researchers have invested significant effort into this task, each addressing different stakeholder needs. Some
of these works have also resulted in experimental platforms such as AIDR (Imran, Castillo, et al. 2014),
CrisisTracker (Rogstadius et al. 2013), Twitcident (Abel et al. 2012) and EPIC Analyse (Barrenechea et al. 2015),
among others. Despite these efforts, technological solutions have not seen wide-spread adoption by response
services, with commonly cited reasons including data quality (Hiltz et al. 2014), limited trained staff (Plotnick
et al. 2015), resistance to social media as a primary communication channel (Tapia et al. 2013), and difficulties in
integrating social media with current organizational policy/procedures (Reuter, Heger, et al. 2013). Indeed, Reuter,
Backfried, et al. 2018 concluded in their study of ISCRAM papers that such research efforts have only made “a
relatively small contribution to actual technology and industry”.
The research community is poorly positioned to tackle institutional or staffing issues, but questions over data quality
are soluble given sufficient evidence. We argue that by placing more effort into standardizing task definitions,
metrics and datasets, then quantifying the value of automated solutions should be feasible. To this end, in 2018
we founded the Incident Streams (TREC-IS) initiative to establish this standardization (McCreadie et al. 2019).
TREC-IS develops test collections and evaluation methodologies to evaluate automated social media monitoring
solutions for crisis responders and to provide a re-occurring data challenge in which academic groups and solution
providers can participate. Insights from that pilot edition (TREC-IS 2018) are detailed in an associated 2019
ISCRAM paper (McCreadie et al. 2019).
This paper continues that previous work, detailing the design improvements, new datasets, and insights gained
from TREC-IS. TREC-IS 2019 includes two editions, 2019-A and 2019-B, and has a release of associated labelled
Twitter dataset for each. This paper’s primary contributions include:
1. The official overview for TREC-IS 2019, containing the 2019 task description, updated design and motivation,
as well as dataset and participant performance statistics;
2. An analysis of actionable information, both in terms of prevalence and the factors that contribute to a social
media message being seen as critical for emergency responders; and
3. A detailed examination of participant systems and insights about what learning and featurization techniques
perform well in identifying high-priority, actionable information during times of crisis.
RELATED EFFORTS AND PRIOR EDITIONS OF TREC-IS
TREC-IS is part of a broader set of crisis informatics efforts that explore social media’s role in the emergency
management domain. This section situates TREC-IS in the context of these related efforts before describing relevant
background from the pilot edition of TREC-IS from 2018.
Related Crisis Informatics Efforts
Early on, researchers recognized social media’s potential as a data source for reactions to and information about
emergencies, but making use of this data has proven non-trivial (Palen and Anderson 2016). For example,
fragmentation in tasks, datasets, and evaluation metrics hinder assessment of state-of-the-art systems. TREC-IS
exists to standardize these issues, with our goals being to construct a clear set of emergency response-relevant tasks,
datasets on which these tasks may be executed, and metrics to evaluate systems’ performance in these tasks.
Within social media streams, a common task for emergency responders is to classify documents based on the
information they contain. A key aspect of TREC-IS is then to support automatic classification of actionable and
useful information types that an emergency responder may want to find. To identify these information types, we
build upon research into categorizing emergency related content. In particular, a survey (Castillo 2016) of previous
categorization efforts identifies eight main dimensions: by information provided/contained (Truelove et al. 2015);
fact vs. subjective vs. emotional content (Kumar et al. 2013); by information source (Olteanu, Castillo, et al. 2014);
by credibility (Castillo et al. 2013); by time (Chowdhury et al. 2013); by location (De Longueville et al. 2009);
by embedded links (Shaw et al. 2013); or by environmental relevance (physical, built or social) (Mileti 1999).
TREC-IS falls within the space of categorization by information provided.
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Crisis informatics researchers have also introduced constrained information tasks beyond classification, instead
determining whether crisis-related social media messages contain sufficient information for a responder to take
action. Purohit et al. (2018) present a model of message serviceability that scores content according to three axes:
whether the message contains an explicit request, is addressed to an individual/organization, and whether it contains
sufficient detail to identify a location, time, or related markers necessary to direct a response. Similarly, Sachdeva
and Kumaraguru (2017) examine text posted to Facebook pages that represent police agencies in India, finding
patterns that drive organizational responses. These narrower information tasks align with prior evidence (e.g., as
shown in TREC-IS 2018 (McCreadie et al. 2019)) that a large majority of social media content posted during crises
are not high-priority or critical messages, meaning simply identifying relevant content is insufficient. TREC-IS
maintains a similar classification of actionable content, consisting of six information types that are consistently
ranked as high-priority messages (e.g., requests for search and rescue or reports of emerging threats). We expand on
this research by investigating aspects of social media content that make it particularly important for emergency
responders.
TREC-IS also builds on lessons learned from the Exploitation of SocialMedia for Emergency Relief and Preparedness
(SMERP) workshop (Ghosh et al. 2017), which examined two challenges: 1) disaster-related text retrieval in Twitter,
and 2) tweet summarization during a disaster event. We have integrated two lessons from SMERP: First, the
information needs defined in the text retrieval task were broad, making it difficult to map an information need to a
response officer’s activity. We therefore developed our own information ontology, detailed later. Second, SMERP
included only four information needs and examined a single event, so participating systems’ generalizability is
unclear. Hence, for TREC-IS, we have opted for a larger pool of multiple events and event types.
Finally, TREC-IS is both part of and builds upon expertise stemming from the Text Retrieval Conference (TREC).
TREC is a combined conference and evaluation campaign that encourages research into information retrieval
technologies on large test collections. Sponsored by NIST, TREC has run annually for over 25 years and consists of
tracks, where a track is an area of focus in which particular retrieval tasks are defined. Tracks act as incubators for
new research areas and often result in foundational research into core technologies, such as search engines (Robertson
et al. 1995) or information extraction from social media (Lin et al. 2016).
TREC-IS Pilot Effort in 2018
In 2018, TREC-IS ran as a new TREC track and established a pilot set of test collections and evaluation methodology
for subsequent editions. This section briefly describes the key organizational aspects of TREC-IS 2018, shown
in Figure 1, as they provide the foundation for our discussion of TREC-IS in 2019. At a high level, participant
TREC-IS systems can perform two tasks: classifying tweets by information type, and ranking tweets by criticality.
As shown in Figure 1, each system receives a stream of filtered, event-relevant tweets and an ontology of information
types from TREC-IS; each system then records tweet-level classifications and priority ratings, which they then
submit for evaluation. We operationalize these tasks, define information types, and generate ground truth labels for
these tasks using human assessors, as follows:
Figure 1. TREC-IS Task Visualization
Crisis-Relevant Information Types and Priorities: TREC-IS 2018 defines information ‘types’ to represent
categories of information that emergency response officers might find interesting, such as ‘Reports of Road
Blockages’ or ‘Calls for Help’. We define these types based on a top-down analysis of incident management
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ontologies, response documentation and discussion with experts. This valuable information is rare on social media,
so to make the track’s datasets useful beyond TREC-IS, we expand these information types via a bottom-up analysis
of tweets. TREC-IS 2018 then groups the identified information needs into higher-level types shown in Table 1,
which we have since modified in TREC-IS 2019, as discussed in later sections (McCreadie et al. 2019).
To capture the importance a given message has to emergency response officers, we also use four information
criticality labels: low, medium, high, and critical, where high- and critical-level messages require prompt or
immediate review and potentially action by an emergency manager. Examples of critical information included calls
for search and rescue, emergence of new threats (e.g., a new gunman, aftershock, or secondary event), or calls for
evacuation.
Event Datasets: TREC-IS 2018 has developed a dataset of past events for training and evaluation. Relevant
crises for TREC-IS include six natural and man-made events: wildfires, earthquakes, floods, typhoons/hurricanes,
bombings, and shootings. In the pilot TREC-IS run, we have relied on event datasets shared by other emergency
management initiatives and augment these sets with two custom crisis-event collections. This original set includes
21 events, 19 from CrisisLex (Olteanu, Castillo, et al. 2014) or CrisisNLP (Imran, Mitra, et al. 2016; Imran,
Elbassuoni, et al. 2013). After pre-filtering to remove tweets marked as irrelevant or non-English and downsampling
our two custom event sets, TREC-IS 2018 ended with approximately 25,000 tweets (Table 2).
Social Media Labelling: To evaluate participant systems, we require ground-truth data on information-type and
criticality labels for the above tweets. For the 2018 effort, six NIST-hired assessors have labeled these tweets,
marking priority and all relevant information types per message. After de-duplication, this labeling has resulted in
19,784 labeled tweets with 43,514 information types.
Evaluating Participant Systems: A key aspect of TREC-IS and TREC more generally is that research and
professional groups submit systems to the track for evaluation. These research prototypes are instrumental for
establishing the state-of-the-art and in driving research agendas in identifying the hard technical problems in these
tasks. Each participating research group is allowed to submit up to four runs from candidate systems, each of which
is referred to as a run and is evaluated separately. In 2018, 11 research groups from 8 countries have participated,
submitting a total of 39 runs.
Metrics: The 2018 TREC-IS edition evaluated each participating run across two axes: information-type categoriza-
tion, and information criticality. For information-type categorization under the 2018 pilot, participant systems were
allowed only one information type per tweet, but when working with NIST assessors, we realized this constraint
was burdensome. We therefore allowed NIST assessors to provide multiple labels per tweet despite the one-label
participant constraint and evaluated information-type categorization in two ways: multi-type and any-type (we have
since changed this restriction in 2019). The second axis of evaluation for a TREC-IS system was the extent to which
it could rank information that emergency response officers need to see. Since our criticality labels are ordered (e.g.,
“low” is less than “critical”), we assigned numeric scores to these labels and calculated theMean Squared Error
between the human-assigned score and a system’s score for each tweet.
Summary of TREC-IS 2018 Systems: To summarize what participants in the TREC-IS 2018 pilot attempted, it is
worth noting the 2018 systems had far fewer training examples (around 1,300 tweets, denoted ‘Boostrap’ in Table 2)
than systems in TREC-IS 2019, along with a small set of indicator terms for each of the 25 information types. As
such, some approaches reported simply using keyword matching between frequently occurring indicator terms
and the tweets within the stream for each event (Mehrotra and Pal 2018). This approach was one of the better
performing in terms of categorization precision, but its recall was poor. Other approaches focused on using the
limited training examples and indicator terms to produce supervised machine learned models, which can be divided
along three dimensions: 1) how they expanded the training dataset to obtain sufficient examples for model learning;
2) how they represent tweets; and 3) what type of learning they attempted (classical or deep learning/neural). For
example, two groups (Miyazak et al. 2018; García-Cumbreras et al. 2018) used Wordnet to expand the event query
and indicator terms to increase recall. Success using this approach was mixed, as care needed to be taken not to
expand too far and reduce the discriminative power of the query and indicator terms. Another group collected news
articles from the BBC and Fox News that closely matched the event query to collect additional training data.
In terms of tweet representation, participants primarily focused on the tweet text, with some additionally considering
the tweet author (Choi et al. 2018) or date information (Miyazak et al. 2018). Date information in particular was
reported to add value (Miyazak et al. 2018). When representing the tweet texts, the most common approach was a
bag of words representation (usually with term frequency-inverse document frequency weighting). Other groups
reported improved performance using word-embeddings (Miyazaki et al. 2019) and entity extraction methods (Choi
et al. 2018).
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Table 1. Ontology High-level Information Types
For learning methodology, most groups opted for classical machine learning approaches (e.g., support vector
machines or Naive Bayes), although a few groups also tested neural models (convolutional neural nets and multi-layer
perceptrons). Where comparisons were made, classical approaches were more effective in 2018, though we will
contrast these findings with 2019 participants later in this paper.
Main Conclusions from TREC-IS 2018 TREC-IS’s pilot run and the eleven teams that participated provided
invaluable information about system evaluation, metrics, and data collection. That effort demonstrated that a
non-trivial (approximately 10% post-filtering) amount of actionable information exists in Twitter during emergency
events. We also found that cutting-edge systems of the time were insufficient for end users’ needs in classifying
information type and priority. While participants were relatively effective at identifying news reports and sentiment,
they struggled to identify critical information like search and rescue requests (McCreadie et al. 2019).
UPDATES TO TREC-IS IN 2019
Conclusions from TREC-IS 2018 motivated us to continue this effort, as the need for computational support in
identifying critical information present in social media remains unfulfilled. To expand opportunities to engage
with the track, we have run TREC-IS twice in 2019, a first edition (2019-A) in June 2019, and the main TREC
edition (2019-B) in September 2019. In both editions, participants have submitted systems for classifying tweets by
information type and criticality, though we have modified performance metrics to differentiate between actionable
information types and all types.
As before, participant systems are provided training datasets of tweets, labeled by information type and criticality.
Unlike the 2018 edition, however, 2019 editions allow participant systems to provide multiple information types per
tweet, rather than the single-type constraint in 2018. This change brings participants’ information categorization
task into alignment with the assessors’ labeling task. In particular, participant systems now provide all categories
they consider relevant for a tweet, with the categorization metrics updated to reflect this modification. These metrics,
in effect, capture the overlap between assessor-selected categories and system-selected categories, where more
overlap indicates better performance.
We have also made minor alterations to the information-type ontology, removing one of the 25 TREC-IS 2018
categories, adding a new one for locations, and refining four of the remaining types.1 Table 1 presents this updated
ontology, with ∗ noting TREC-IS 2019 modifications. Specifically, we have removed the “Other-Unknown” category,
as this category was very rare and have merged its contents into the “Other-Irrelevant” category. We have also
added Report-Location to capture whether a tweet contains information about the location of the tweet subject, as
such information is important to responders.
1see http://trecis.org/2019/2019Changes.html
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Table 2. TREC-IS Datasets and Labelling Statistics
New Datasets
For each TREC-IS edition, we have released a new dataset of tweets, their information types, and their priority
labels, as produced by human assessors.As we have run TREC-IS twice in 2019, each edition has a new dataset,
and systems are allowed to use datasets from prior editions for training. E.g., for 2019-A, participants could use
the ‘bootstrap’ and ‘2018’ TREC-IS pilot datasets for training. We then evaluate systems over the new 2019-A
dataset, which contains 6 new events and around 8,500 tweets. Similarly, for 2019-B participants can leverage the
‘bootstrap’, ‘2018’ and ‘2019-A’ datasets for training and are evaluated against the ‘2019-B’ dataset, which contains
a further 6 events and 9,200 tweets. Over the four datasets created so far, TREC-IS has manually assessed over
35,000 tweets from 33 unique disasters, producing in excess of 125,000 labels. These events, sources and statistics
are summarized in Table 2.
We note three additional differences between the datasets in 2018 pilot and TREC-IS 2019:
• We no longer rely on the CrisisLex or CrisisNLP datasets and instead use new events retrospectively crawled
by TREC-IS organizers, based on manually selected keywords.2
• As our new event collections are both high-volume and noisy, we also downsample them. This filter process
first removes non-English tweets, and for any event with more than 1,000 tweets remaining, we apply KMeans
clustering (k = 2,500) to tweet texts and select one tweet from each cluster as that cluster’s sample. Our
assessment interface performs a further redundancy check on this downsampled collection, removing very
similar tweets using cosine similarity-based fuzzy matching. Assessors then label any remaining tweets.
• For 2019-B, we transitioned fully to contemporary events that occurred in 2019. This move is notable, as
Twitter now allows tweets in excess of 140 characters, which may affect participant systems and previously
constructed models.
In all cases, assessors label either all sampled tweets per event or the budgeted assessment time expires. This time
constraint is notable for 2019-B, where 15,000 were sampled, but only around 9,200 have been assessed (cf. #
Sampled and # Assessed columns in Table 2).
2With one exception where a participating group donated an event.
CoRe Paper – Social Media for Disaster Response and Resilience
Proceedings of the 17th ISCRAM Conference – Blacksburg, VA, USA May 2020
Amanda Lee Hughes, Fiona McNeill and Christopher Zobel, eds.
Richard McCreadie et al. Incident Streams 2019
Table 3. Six Actionable Information Types
New Metrics Introduced in TREC-IS 2019
An additional conclusion from our 2018 pilot is that calculating performance metrics over all information types is
insufficient. I.e., taking the macro average of these metrics over all types biases our results towards common but
less critical categories, as these common types often lack actionable information. Consequently, we have modified
evaluation metrics as follows:
Information Feed: To evaluate information-type classification performance, we calculate metrics, like accuracy,
micro-averaged over all events but macro-averaged over information types. Emergency response officers, however,
primarily care about seeing all valuable information; i.e. missing actionable information is more serious than seeing
irrelevant data. We therefore report performance metrics when considering all information types and considering
only actionable information types. This meta-class of actionable information types (Table 3) captures content that
is likely critical for an emergency response officer to see. These constrained metrics therefoer provide better insight
into system performance on the most important types of information. Specifically, we measure:
• Information Feed, Info. Type Accuracy, All: Overall classification accuracy, micro-averaged across
events and macro-averaged across information types. This metric yields a high-level view of categorization
performance but does not capture utility to emergency response officers.
• Information Feed, Info. Type Positive F1, All: Categorization performance when only considering the
target class per information type. E.g., performance for the ‘Request-SearchAndRescue’ information type
only includes the few tweets belonging to that type. This metric measures signal shown to emergency
response officers while ignoring any noise that the system also produces. The ‘All’ version of this metric
macro-averages over all information types.
• Information Feed, Info. Type Positive F1, Actionable: The same as the above metric but only considers
actionable information types shown in Table 3. This metric aims to capture whether systems find actionable
information.
Information Priority: TREC-IS metrics also evaluate whether systems can identify key information that
emergency response officers need to see, which we operationalize by comparing a system’s information priority
score for each tweet and that tweet’s priority label as given by an assessor.
For this metric, however, we first map assessors’ information priority labels into numerical scores (i.e., low=0.25,
medium=0.5, high=0.75 and critical=1.0). Second, since some participant systems do not provide scores within an
appropriate 0-1 range, we normalize these systems’ scores via a max-min normalization, with a minimum score
cap of 0.25. Our priority estimation metric then measures the Mean Squared Error (RMSE) between assessor
score and normalized system priority score. As with information feed metrics, to distinguish between prioritization
performance for actionable categories against all categories, we report prioritization error for all information types
and over only the actionable types.
• Prioritization, Priority RMSE, All: Overall prioritization error, micro-averaged across events and macro-
averaged across all information types.
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• Prioritization, Priority RMSE, Actionable: Prioritization error, micro-averaged across events and macro-
averaged across only actionable information types (Table 3).
Tweet Labeling Process
Each tweet in the TREC-IS collections is labeled by a TREC assessor. These assessors all have strong information
analysis skills and experience in labeling text and social media for TREC-IS and other TREC retrieval and
classification tasks. Prior to performing labeling tasks, each assessor receives a two-hour, in-person training session
that includes an overview of the emergency event scenario and guidance on identifying actionable information
within each event type. Assessors then exercise their training in a guided, hands-on, group labeling session using
the 2012 Colorado wildfires event. Assessors are also allowed to use Wikipedia entries for each event to familiarize
themselves with its timeline and geography.
For each labeling task, assessors use an assessment tool that displays the raw text of the tweet and renders it using
Twitter’s API, which replicates the view (replete with embedded multimedia) a user would see natively on Twitter.
Assessors then decide if each tweet is actually relevant to the event, if it contains actionable information, and assigns
one or more category labels and a priority level to the tweet.
In most cases, all tweets collected for a single event are labeled by one assessor to minimize inconsistencies within
an event that could arise from disagreement between assessors. The TREC-IS 2019 budget has not allowed for
multiple assessors per tweet, precluding agreement evaluations, but tweets labeled as actionable have been reviewed
by track organizers, as described in the next section.
ANALYSING ASSESSOR LABELS AND PARTICIPANT METHODS
Having presented the structure and changes to TREC-IS 2019, we now turn to this paper’s remaining contributions:
an analysis of tweets assessors labeled as critical or actionable, and an exploration of participant systems’ techniques
and performance. For analysing assessors’ labels, we examine the 35,000 manually assessed tweets to answer the
following three research questions:
• RQ1.1 – What types of information constitute critical messages, and how prevalent are they on Twitter?
• RQ1.2 – Is the amount of critical information changing as Twitter evolves?
• RQ1.3 – What features of a social media message make it actionable?
Following discussion of critical and actionable content, we then analyse systems submitted to TREC-IS 2019.
This study investigates the 35 participant runs submitted to 2019-A and the 32 runs submitted to 2019-B, which
collectively originate from 15 research groups. We answer the following three research questions about these runs:
• RQ2.1 – What techniques did participants explore?
• RQ2.2 – How well did these different systems perform?
• RQ2.3 – Are different techniques yielding different performance results?
RQ1.1 – What Types of Critical Information Appear in Social Media?
A key finding in TREC-IS 2018 is that assessors find a non-trivial number (14.4%) of tweets containing high-priority
or critical information across 21 disaster-related event datasets. While this result supports the common belief that
social media contains useful and important content during emergencies, we find the majority of these high-priority
messages fall into the six “actionable” information types shown in Table 3. Many events from TREC-IS 2018
occurred in 2013-2014, however, whereas TREC-IS 2019 editions are taken primarily from 2019, and the distribution
of critical information may have changed over the years. Given this new data and the potential for Twitter’s
population and popularity to evolve, we revisit this analysis of criticality and information type.
Globally, across TREC-IS editions, the average tweet criticality is µ = 0.3507 with a standard deviation σ = 0.1791,
placing the average tweet in a low-to-medium priority. This metric is slightly lower than but consistent with results
from the 2018 edition, wherein we find µ2018 = 0.3632. Decomposing this importance by priority level for the 2019
editions (Figure 2a), assessors score 87.3% of tweets as low-to-medium priority (72% and 15.3% respectively, up
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from 85.6% in 2018). Prevalence of high-importance tweets has decreased in 2019, from 13.6% to 10.3%, but
critical tweets have increased from 0.8% to 1.1%. In both cases, assessors see approximately 10% of tweets about
disasters as highly important.
Turning to the interaction between criticality and information type in Figure 2b, our results are consistent with
TREC-IS 2018: Actionable categories have the highest mean priorities, with a distinct separation between the first
three types (search and rescue, calls for relocation, and new sub-events) and the second three (emerging threats,
reports of new service availability, and requests for goods/services). This ordering indicates that our actionable
information types are consistently more likely to contain critical insights, regardless of edition, answering RQ 1.1.
RQ1.2 – Is Criticality Changing Over Time?
Next, we examine information criticality distributions across TREC-IS editions. We first analyse criticality by
edition: Bootstrap/2018A, 2018/2018B, 2019A and 2019B in Figure 3. An important observation apparent from
this figure is that 2019A contains proportionally far more low-priority tweets and consequently fewer medium- and
high-priority tweets than other editions. For critical tweets, however, we see a consistent increase over the editions,
which might indicate the volume of critical information is increasing over time (as later editions use more recent
events). Alternatively, our sampling is simply capturing more critical information. Hence, the question arises:
As Twitter evolves and its user population grows, is the amount of critical information posted during crises also
changing? Using assessors’ evaluations from all TREC-IS editions, we can evaluate this yearly message priority. To
this end, Table 4 reports event and tweet counts per year in TREC-IS datasets, and Figure 4 depicts annual changes
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Figure 4. Tweet Priority Over Event Years
between 2011-2019. Figure 4a shows the Joplin tornado in 2011 had a tendency toward high-priority content, with
2012-2016 seeming to regress to the mean. Surprisingly, 2017 and 2018 see a large drop in mean priority. Figure
4b captures this effect as well, with high- and critical-priority content accounting for slightly more than 10% in all
years except 2017 and 2018. These aberrations in 2017 and 2018 may result from event paucity in these years or
from the over-representation of shootings in those years, which account for two of the three events. To conclude on
RQ 1.2, we do not have strong evidence of increasing criticality over time; rather, the volume of critical information
seems centered around 10% of the sampled streams, although this is strongly tied to the type of events covered.
Table 4. Yearly Breakdown of Events and Tweets
RQ1.3 – What Makes a Tweet Actionable?
Having shown valuable information is consistently available on social media during emergencies, the natural
question is: what makes a tweet actionable, or at least valuable for a response officer to see? This question is
important for system builders, as its answer indicates what factors a system should consider. While assessors
provide both information-type and priority labels for each tweet, these labels do not tell us why they were assigned
or what information was used to make that determination. As such, we require additional information to answer the
above question.
While related work discussed above (Sachdeva and Kumaraguru 2017; Purohit et al. 2018) provides insight into the
factors that make a post actionable by a response agency, we also perform a smaller-scale labelling study to identify
whether additional priority-centric factors are present in critical crisis-related messages. We therefore select 170
tweets labeled as ‘Critical’ priority by our assessors in 2019-B – forming a set of likely valuable tweets. Next,
we render each tweet using the same assessment interface as NIST assessors. A subset of TREC-IS coordinators
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review each of these critical tweets, and a new assessor identifies features of the tweet that appear to contribute to
actionability. Note, this new assessor was a computer scientist and experienced in the construction of automatic
systems for this task (i.e., was a participant in previous TREC-IS editions). Hence, their categorization is reflective
of factors one might believe an automatic system should consider when categorizing each tweet. After all tweets are
analysed, we aggregate the outcome into three high-level information sources (Tweet Text, Linked Content and
Author) with a total of 10 sub-categories, shown in the top part of Table 5 below.
Table 5. Information contained within the critical tweets from 2019-B.
Table 5’s right-hand columns report critical-tweet counts and proportions of actionable tweets in which that
information type was important. First, as we might expect, the most common information source is a tweet’s text
(97%); the remaining 3% of critical tweets may link to critical information (e.g., an evacuation order) or contain
media data without text. Second, the vast majority of critical tweets (88%) also explicitly mention a location,
consistent with the idea of serviceability as most emergency responses would need a location to send a response.
Location references are also substantially more prevalent than in the overall tweet stream; e.g., assessors identified
only 53% of 2019-B tweets as having an explicit location label. Third, unexpectedly, only 20% of critical tweets
clearly mention the event, potentially because some events lacked a common descriptor when the critical information
appeared, e.g. no agreed upon hashtag, or location(s) were used as a proxy (like ‘Highlands Ranch just had a school
shooting’). Practically, textual topical-relevance indicators appear less useful for identifying actionable tweets here.
About 6% of tweets also contain either a temporal expression (e.g., ‘issued at 3:40 a.m.’ or ‘2 min ago’) or mention
a relevant person (e.g., an official), and these factors aid in contextualizing the content by supporting the reader in
determining whether the content is current or a quotation.
Beyond tweet text, most critical tweets also provide some form of linked content (69%, sum of Linked Content
sub-categories). The most prevalent type of useful linked content is either an article or web-page (49%); e.g.,
a news article is just published that contains on-the-ground reporting or a live feed. The next most prevalent is
linked tweets (12%), followed by a small number of images and videos (5% and 3%, respectively). This result
highlights that systems should not only rely on tweet text but also integrate linked content when identifying critical
information. The last category of information that we consider is the name or username of the author of the tweet,
which our assessor has mark as useful for only 4% of tweets, suggesting that author identity or veracity is not a
strong indicator of actionable information.
Finally, two additional cases that are not strictly related to information within tweets are worth highlighting. First,
our assessor noted that for 25% of tweets, extracting mentioned locations would require deeper knowledge of the
affected region’s geography. E.g., in the extract, ‘Three wildfires currently out of control south of High Level, north
of Peace River and north of Slave Lake currently’, the actual referenced location is implicit and is only mentioned
relative to other (unaffected) places. In the social media context, a tweet’s author might naturally assume the reader
has sufficient local knowledge, but this understanding is difficult for current geolocation technology.
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Second, for 24% of tweets, our assessor questioned whether some actionable information was truly useful because,
at the time of the tweet, the information was out-of-date. This line of inquiry occurred because the assessor saw the
same information earlier in the stream, suggesting the response officer might similarly have seen this information
previously. During the general TREC-IS labelling task, NIST assessors are instructed to consider each tweet
independently, meaning our labels do not account for whether similar information has been previously seen.
RQ2.1 – What Did Participants Try?
Before analysing participant systems’ performance, it is valuable to analyse what techniques are employed by these
systems, which can provide insights into common approaches and trends in technology. In this section, we discuss
trends in system descriptions for 2019-A and 2019-B based on the 2-3 sentence short summary participants submit
with their systems.3 We describe four main observations below:
• Machine Learned Categorization is Prevalent: 89.6% of submitted runs use a form of supervised machine
learning to categorise tweets into information types. Two groups opted for a different approach, however:
UAGPLSI experimented with a direct application of textual similarity between information-type descriptions
and tweets, and IIT-BHU used unsupervised clustering to create vectors for each information type and
calculated similarity between those vectors and tweets. Neither of these alternatives were as effective as
supervised approaches.
• Word Embeddings are the Most Common and Effective Text Representation: All participant systems
leveraged tweet text during categorization by converting text into a numerical vector representation. In
2019-A, 46% of systems used classical bag-of-words or n-gram representation, while the remaining 54% used
a form of word or character sequence embedding (via GloVe, FastText or SkipThought, or otherwise implicitly
generate a text embedding using a neural model like BERT). In 2019-B, embedding-based approaches
increased to 56%, while classical representations dropped to 34%.4 Examining the top 10 approaches for each
year, 6/10 and 9/10 used embeddings in 2019-A and 2019-B respectively, indicating that these embeddings
are a superior representation to classical approaches. Despite this result, we lack sufficient data to identify a
best-performing embedding method.
• Deep Learning is BecomingMore Prevalent and Effective, but TraditionalMachine Learning Remains
Competitive: Of the machine learning runs submitted, usage of deep-learning approaches was limited in
2019-A (29%) but increased to 39% in 2019-B. The majority still use traditional machine learning approaches
(e.g., Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression or Random Forests). We also observed a large increase in the number
of deep-learning based systems in the top 10 across editions (1/10 in 2019-A vs. 6/10 in 2019-B), indicating
that participants are learning how to make neural approaches more effective. On the other hand, we note that
the most effective system in terms of identifying actionable content for both editions is still a classical rather
than deep learned model.
• Evidence Suggests Participants Are Not Integrating Supporting/Linked Data: Despite our finding that
linked data contributes to making a tweet actionable, no participants mentioned leveraging such data in their
system descriptions. While it is possible that participants did make use of such evidence but omitted any
reference to it, it seems likely that usage of such data is still largely unexplored for this task.
RQ2.2 – How Well Did Participants Perform?
Tables 6 and 7 present performance metrics for 2019-A and 2019-B respectively for each run submitted by the 15
participant groups, ordered by F1 score across actionable information. While results are not comparable across
editions (i.e., the underlying events are different), overall trends are comparable. A clear (and expected) result
in both 2019-A and 2019-B shows F1 scores for actionable information types are significantly lower than for all
information types; on average, runs achieve a two-to-three-fold increase in F1 by expanding to all information types.
Across both editions, only runs from UAGPLSI performed as well or better on actionable types than on all types.
A similar pattern exists for message prioritization, wherein performance increases by a factor of 1.5-to-2 from
prioritizing actionable tweets to all tweets. This result shows actionable types are more difficult to identify than
non-actionable types.
3Caveat: These summaries only provide us information about what participants thought was important enough to include, and hence will be
incomplete. As such, caution should be taken when drawing conclusions from this data.
4For 2019-B. 10% of runs did not specify how they represented the tweet text.
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Beyond comparing classification performance in actionable versus all information types, we also compare run
rankings between actionable versus all information types and between F1 versus priority. In the former case, systems
that perform well for actionable types may not perform well for all types, but an analysis of the rankings between
these two systems suggests otherwise. That is, Spearman rank correlations between runs ranked by F1-actionable
and F1-all are strong (> 0.69 in both editions), suggesting systems that do well at identifying actionable information
also do well at identifying other information types. Between F1-actionable and RMSE-actionable, however, we
see a different result: Spearman rank correlations are very weak to weak (between 0.19 and 0.4 in both editions),
suggesting a disconnect between identifying actionable information type and ranking the most critical messages
within these types.
A final key observation over both editions is that the average F1 scores for both actionable and all information types
is very low (e.g., mean F1 on actionable types is 0.050 in 2019-A and 0.057 in 2019-B). Further, across 2019-A and
2019-B, only two runs perform beyond two standard deviations away from the mean (the top two irlabISI runs in
2019-A). This result holds for prioritization as well in both 2019-A and 2019-B, suggesting the overall state of
the art in these tasks fall far short of addressing the needs of emergency response users. We see this finding as
motivation to continue the TREC-IS initiative into 2020.
Table 6. 2019-A Submitted runs under the v2.3 evaluation script. Information Feed metrics range from 0 to 1,
higher is better. Prioritization metrics range from 0 to 1, lower is better. The highest performance under each
metric is highlighted in bold.
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Table 7. 2019-B Submitted runs under the v2.3 evaluation script. Alerting metrics range from -1 to 1, higher is
better. Information Feed metrics range from 0 to 1, higher is better. Prioritization metrics range from 0 to 1, lower
is better.
RQ2.3 – How Do Different Learning Methods Perform?
As our earlier analysis of system descriptions illustrates, participants employ a variety of feature engineering and
learning methods, and we can use this variation to evaluate how these different approaches impact performance.
This question is further motivated by the observation that traditional learning methods are still competitive compared
to more sophisticated deep learning approaches. Hence, in this section, we divide 2019-B participant systems
into several comparison groups and merge all systems in each group into an exemplar system. We then examine
precision and recall for our six actionable information types, comparing performance across these groups to the
“meta-system” comprised of combined outputs from all groups. These comparisons illuminate whether the different
approaches capture similar dynamics in tweet content because, if the meta-system has similar precision or recall to
one or more of the comparison groups, then the alternate groups are providing little new information. Alternatively,
if the meta-system deviates significantly from the comparison groups, each comparison group must be capturing
different aspects of the data.
In our first comparison, we divide systems by ML paradigm: systems using traditional ML models (e.g., Logistic
Regression, Naive Bayes, Random Forests, etc.) versus systems using deep learning methods (e.g., LSTMs, CNNs,
etc.). Based on our analysis of system descriptions, 19 of the 2019-B systems use traditional ML approaches,
compared to 11 that use deep learning. Figure 5a illustrates the differences in precision and recall for these classes
of systems, showing the unified deep learning system obtains a slightly higher precision but lower recall than the
traditional ML systems. Crucially though, Figure 5a shows the meta system achieves approximately 8% higher
recall than either traditional or deep learning systems, suggesting that while these two approaches generally capture
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Figure 5. Performance in Actionable Information Types by Comparison Group
similar messages across our actionable types, each group appears able to identify a unique set of content. This
result in turn indicates that ensemble approaches may be effective in the future.
An alternative driver for differences in performance may be featurization strategies systems employ. Systems
that use recent advances in embeddings, for example, may outperform standard bag-of-words (BoW) methods by
integrating context from large, pre-trained models. We examine this possibility in another set of comparisons,
wherein we divide systems into three featurization groups: standard BoW (12 systems), word/n-gram embeddings
(11 systems), and BERT-based bidirectional embeddings (7 systems). From this analysis, we find embedding-based
systems (primarily GloVe and FastText) outperform BoW- and BERT-based models in recall (Figure 5b). As in the
ML comparison, the meta-system achieves at least 15% higher recall than any comparison group, suggesting that
the different featurization strategies reveal different sets of important messages.
GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE SYSTEMS
We now summarize several considerations for future systems designers:
Importance of Location in Criticality Assessment: As shown in Table 5, the majority of content perceived as
critical includes an explicit mention of a location. This result is consistent with the serviceability model
presented in Purohit et al. (2018) and suggests future systems would benefit from extracting place names and
integrating geolocation pipelines, both for evaluating proximity to an event and for providing responders with
actionable information.
Integrate Linked Content for Criticality Assessment: Also in Table 5, the article or web page to which a tweet
links often contains valuable information that contributes to a tweet’s perceived priority. Future systems
could index this linked content or include the domain of the included link to capture this information.
Use of Word Embeddings in Classification: Many participating systems leveraged word embeddings when fea-
turizing textual content. Our analysis suggests these embeddings provide a superior representation to classical
bag-of-words approaches in both precision and recall for actionable information types. We lack data to
determine which embeddings are superior, however.
Ensemble Learning: A meta-system outperforms individual systems by a significant margin, suggesting the
different approaches employed by TREC-IS participants are capturing different aspects of information types.
Future systems could therefore integrate a diverse set of featurization strategies and learning models into a
single ensemble system.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have provided an overview of the new 2019 editions (2019-A and 2019-B) of TREC-IS. TREC-IS is
a standardization initiative that develops test collections and evaluation methodologies for identifying and categorize
information and aid-requests made on social media during crisis situations. It also incorporates re-occurring data
challenges in which researchers/developers can participate, enabling comparison of state-of-the-art systems. Over
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two years and three editions, TREC-IS has manually annotated tweet streams for 33 emergency events, comprising
35,000 tweets and producing over 125,000 labels.
This paper provides analysis of both manually labeled tweets and systems participating in TREC-IS 2019, yielding
insights into both what information is actionable and critical for crisis responders, as well as what automated
techniques perform well in identifying high-priority, actionable information during times of crisis. From this
analysis, we show high-priority information on social media tends to be either calls for aid, warnings about new
sub-events or threats, evacuation information and reports of services coming back online, consistent with TREC-IS
2018. Furthermore, we show overall volumes of high or critical information remains near 10% of our samples.
Through analysis of these critical tweets, we also show both mentions of location and linked content are more
prevalent in critical messages than in the overall stream, indicating that these factors are important when finding
high-priority content in a social media stream.
10 organizations participated in both the 2019-A and 2019-B editions (15 unique groups), submitting a total of
67 runs. Through analysis of these systems, we observe that the prevalence and effectiveness of deep learning
approaches is increasing (particularly BERT-based systems), but little evidence exists that systems are integrating
linked content within the tweets, which may improve effectiveness. In terms of overall performance, we are confident
that systems are both becoming more sophisticated and improving in performance, but advances still need to be
made before such systems will be ready for live deployment.
The Incident Streams track is slated to continue in TREC 2020 with a further two editions. All tweet streams, labels
and participation details can be found at http://trecis.org.
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